



Normative Elegance vs. Behavioural Evidence - Negotiations with Incomplete Information under Time Pressure

By Martin Schilling

GRIN Verlag Jul 2007, 2007. Taschenbuch. Book Condition: Neu. 210x148x2 mm. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Neuware - Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject Economics - Macro-economics, general, grade: 1,4, London School of Economics, 22 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: Behavioural evidence of negotiations with incomplete information under time pressure and the underlying normative bargaining models are the core topics of this essay. First, the most important game-theoretical approaches to bargaining settings of the last decades are discussed: Nash's axiomatic approach, Rubinstein's sequential model and negotiation models with incomplete information. Building on this normative ideals, the second section focuses on empirical approaches to test negotiators behaviour under incomplete information and time pressure. Third, a further research path to negotiations with incomplete information under time pressure is developed. In the Appendix the ultimatum game is solved by a Bayesian-Nash approach. 28 pp. Englisch.

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